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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyse the link between the macroeconomic developments and the 
banking credit risk in a particular group of countries – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and 
Italy (GIPSI) – recently affected by unfavourable economic and financial conditions and to 
which, on this matter, the literature has not given a particular attention yet. 
Employing dynamic panel data approaches to these five countries over the period 
1997q1-2011q3, we conclude that the banking credit risk is significantly affected by the 
macroeconomic environment: the credit risk increases when GDP growth and the share price 
indices decrease and rises when the unemployment rate, interest rate, and credit growth 
increase; it is also positively affected by an appreciation of the real exchange rate; moreover, 
we observe a substantial increase in the credit risk during the recent financial crisis period. 
Several robustness tests with different estimators have also confirmed these results. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has called the attention to the consequences that banking 
crises can have on the economy (Agnello and Sousa, 2011; Agnello et al., 2011). At the same 
time, it has also stimulated some economists to look again at the factors that may trigger a 
banking crisis (De Grauwe, 2008; Laeven and Valencia, 2008, 2010). Macroeconomic factors 
are considered to play an important role on this matter (Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache, 
1998; Llewellyn, 2002). More specifically, adverse economic conditions, where growth is low 
or negative, with high levels of unemployment, high interest rates and high inflation, are 
favourable to banking crises (Demirguç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998). Llewellyn (2002) also 
notices that in any banking crisis there is an interaction between economic, financial and 
structural weaknesses. Moreover, most of the banking crisis is preceded by changes in the 
economic environment that move the economy from a growth cycle to a recession. 
A banking crisis may also arise because, in first place, banks can be struggling with 
liquidity and/or insolvency problems caused by the increase of bad or nonperforming loans in 
their balance sheets. This also means that before looking at the causes of banking crisis, we 
must give attention to the conditionings of the banking credit risk. Several studies have 
focused their attention on this matter and have concluded that the macroeconomic 
environment is the most important factor in the determination of the credit risk.1 
In this paper, we intend to understand this link between the macroeconomic 
developments and the credit risk in a particular group of countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, 
Spain and Italy – henceforth, GIPSI) recently affected by unfavourable economic and 
financial conditions and to which the literature has not given a particular attention yet on this 
matter. The unfavourable conditions that they are facing (recession and unemployment), the 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Salas and Saurina (2002), Jimenez and Saurina (2006), Quagliariello (2006), Jakubík (2007), 
Aver (2008), Bohachova (2008), Bonfim (2009), Kattai (2010), Festic et al. (2011), Nkuzu (2011) and Louzis et 
al. (2012), among others. 
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high levels of public deficits and debts that they present and the difficulties that they have felt 
in borrowing money to finance their economies were critical in our decision of choosing them 
for this analysis. This deterioration of the economic environment may increase the risk of 
credit default in these countries. Therefore, it becomes pertinent to study how macroeconomic 
variables are affecting the credit risk in this more vulnerable group of countries and the 
respective policy implications. As the risk of default is highly influenced by the way families 
and companies are affected by the economic environment, we believe that some 
macroeconomic factors will take a substantial part in the explanation of the credit risk. 
Employing a proper dynamic panel data approach, that relies on the Arellano-Bond 
estimator, over this particular group of countries spanning the period from the first quarter of 
1997 to the third quarter of 2011, we conclude that the credit risk in these five countries is 
significantly affected by the macroeconomic environment. In particular, the credit risk 
increases when GDP growth and the share price indices decrease, and rises when the 
unemployment rate, interest rate, and credit growth increase. It is also positively affected with 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Moreover, we observe a substantial increase in the 
credit risk during the recent financial crisis period. Several robustness tests with different 
estimators have also confirmed these results. 
In terms of policy implications, this means that structural measures and programmes 
that can be implemented to promote external competitiveness, to increase productivity, to 
reduce external and public debt and to support growth and employment in these countries are 
fundamental to stabilize their economies. 
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the 
determinants of the credit risk. Section 3 describes the data and the hypotheses to test. The 
econometric model is explained in section 4. The empirical results are presented and 
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes emphasizing the main findings of this article. 
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2. Review of the literature 
There are several empirical studies that analyse the influence of macroeconomic and 
specific banking sector factors on the credit risk or nonperforming loans. In general, the credit 
risk is defined as the risk of a loan not being (partially or totally) paid to the lender. The 
analysis of the credit risk is essential because it can provide signs of alarm when the financial 
sector becomes more vulnerable to shocks. This can help the regulatory authorities to take 
measures to prevent a possible crisis (Agnello and Sousa, 2011; Agnello et al., 2011). 
According to Heffernan (2005), the analysis of the credit risk is also important because many 
banks’ bankruptcies are related to the huge ratio of nonperforming loans to the total loans. 
In the literature, we find an important distinction between the kind of factors that can 
affect banking credit risk: factors influencing the systematic credit risk; and factors 
influencing the unsystematic credit risk.2 The factors influencing the systematic credit risk 
are: (i) macroeconomic factors like the employment rate, growth in gross domestic product, 
stock index, inflation rate, and exchange rate movements; (ii) changes in economic policies 
like changes in monetary and tax policies, economic legislation changes, as well as import 
restrictions and export stimulation; (iii) and political changes or changes in the goals of 
leading political parties. All these variables can have an important influence on the likelihood 
of borrowers paying their debts, but as changes in economic policies and political changes are 
difficult to examine, the literature has mainly focused on the macroeconomic factors. 
The factors influencing the unsystematic credit risk are specific factors: (i) to the 
individuals like their individual personality, financial solvency and capital, credit insurance; 
(ii) and to the companies like management, financial position, sources of funds and financial 
reporting, their ability to pay the loan and specific factors of the industry sector. Industry 
specific factors may include the structure and economic successfulness of the industry, 
maturity of the industry and its stability. 
                                                 
2
 See, for example, Ahmad and Casu et al. (2006), Ariff (2007), Aver (2008), Saunders and Cornett (2008). 
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A great deal of studies looks at the macroeconomic factors that affect the credit risk. In 
particular, Salas and Saurina (2002), Jimenez and Saurina (2006), Jakubík (2007), Aver 
(2008), Bohachova (2008), Bonfim (2009), Kattai (2010) and Nkuzu (2011), among others, 
concentrate their research essentially on the influence of macroeconomic variables over the 
credit risk growth and stress that those variables should be included into the analysis since 
they have considerable influence on the changes of credit risk. 
Aver (2008) shows that the credit risk of the Slovenian banking loan portfolio depends 
especially on the economic environment (employment and unemployment), long-term interest 
rates and on the value of the stock exchange index. Kattai (2010) and Fainstein and Novikov 
(2011) reach the same conclusion in a study for three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) banking systems. Their results highlight the importance of economic growth and 
interest rates as the most influential factor behind the soundness of the banking system.3 Salas 
and Saurina (2002) and Jakubík (2007), in studies for the Spanish and Czech banking sectors 
respectively, also point out the GDP growth and changes in the interest rates as the main 
macroeconomic factors affecting the credit risk. 
In the same line, Bohachova (2008) concludes that the business cycle plays an 
important role in the evolution of the credit risk: in OECD countries, banks tend to hold 
higher capital ratios during business cycle highs; in non-OECD countries, periods of higher 
economic growth are associated with lower capital ratios (procyclical behavior). Thus, banks 
accumulate risks more rapidly in economically good times and some of these risks materialize 
as asset quality deteriorates during subsequent recessions. Nkuzu (2011) also analyses this 
issue for a sample of 26 advanced economies over the period 1998-2009 using single-
equation panel regressions and a panel vector autoregressive model and confirms the adverse 
link between macroeconomic developments and nonperforming loans. 
                                                 
3
 Contrary to Kattai (2010), Fainstein and Novikov (2011) also notice that the rapid growth of indebtedness has 
been crucial to the growth of non-performing loans. 
  6 
The implications of macroeconomic factors on credit default are also explored in this 
literature. Ali and Daly (2010) employ a logit model over Australian and US data for the 
period 1995-2009 and find that the level of economic activity, interest rates and total debt 
provide meaningful indicators for aggregate default.4 They also notice that the US economy is 
more vulnerable to adverse macroeconomic shocks than the Australian economy. 
In a close line of research, Pesola (2005) analyses the macroeconomic determinants of 
banking sector distresses over a panel of some industrial countries for the period 1980-2002 
using OLS and SUR estimators. According to his results, high customer indebtedness 
combined with adverse macroeconomic surprise shocks to income and real interest rates 
contributed to the distress in banking sector. 
In particular, Pesola (2005), Jimenez and Saurina (2006), Bohachova (2008) and 
Bonfim (2009) conclude that the result of wrong decisions of financing will become apparent 
only during the period of recession of the economy and this will cause the growth of non-
performing loans and loan losses. 
Other authors like, for example, Quagliariello (2006), Festic et al. (2011) and Louzis 
et al. (2012) combine the systematic and unsystematic credit risk factors. Quagliariello (2006) 
uses a large panel of Italian banks over the period 1985-2002 to analyse the movements of 
loan loss provisions and new bad debts over the business cycle using both static fixed-effects 
and dynamic models. His results confirm that banks’ loan loss provisions and new bad debts 
are affected by the evolution of the business cycle but several bank-level indicators also play 
an important role in explaining the changes in the evolution of banks’ riskiness. 
In a dynamic panel data analysis for nine Greek banks over the period 2003-2009, 
Louzis et al. (2012) finds that not only the real GDP growth rate, the unemployment rate and 
the lending rates have a strong effect on the level of nonperforming loans, but also some 
bank-specific variables such as performance and efficiency indicators possess additional 
                                                 
4
 Similar results are also found for Turkey by Cifter et al. (2009). 
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explanatory power. Considering a panel of five new EU member states (Bulgaria, Romania, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Festic et al. (2011) also show that the mix of slowdown in 
economic activity, growth of credit and available finance and lack of supervision are harmful 
to banking performance and deteriorate nonperforming loans dynamics. 
The unsystematic credit risk factors are under the attention of a few studies. Zribi and 
Boujelbène (2011) provide an analysis for Tunisia estimating a panel model controlling for 
random effects for ten commercial banks over the period 1995-2008. Despite they look at 
some macroeconomic factors, they take especially into account the impact of several 
microeconomic variables on credit risk. Their results show that the main determinants of bank 
credit risk in Tunisia are ownership structure, prudential regulation of capital, profitability. 
Jimenes and Saurina (2004) and Ahmad and Ariff (2007) also focus their analysis on 
the unsystematic factors. While Jimenes and Saurina (2004) analyse the determinants of the 
probability of default of bank loans in several Spanish credit institutions, Ahmad and Ariff 
(2007) look at their impact on the credit risk using micro data from commercial banks of 
some emerging and developed economies. They emphasize that regulatory capital and 
management quality are critical to credit risk. The role of collateral, type of lender, bank-
borrower relationship, the characteristics of the borrower and of the loan are also under the 
scope of Jimenes and Saurina’s (2004) study. They find that collateralised loans have a higher 
probability of default, loans granted by savings banks are riskier and that a close bank-
borrower relationship increases the willingness for banks taking more risk. 
This survey of the literature shows that, among the studies on banking credit risk 
determinants, the vast majority of them consider the macroeconomic environment as the most 
important factor in the determination of the credit risk. Moreover, we also observe that they 
are mostly based on a single country analysis. Some provide a multi-country comparative 
analysis, but few use adequate dynamic panel data techniques. Louzis et al. (2012) make such 
analysis but at the bank level for a single country (Greece). 
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In this paper, we intend to extend the empirical analysis to a panel of countries – that 
share common characteristics – using a proper dynamic panel data approach. As we are 
providing an analysis at a macro-level, the macroeconomic variables assume a very important 
role here. Thus, we try to understand the link between the macroeconomic developments and 
the credit risk in the GIPSI, which have been highly affected by unfavourable economic and 
financial conditions and to which, on this matter, no study has given special attention yet. As 
the risk of default is highly influenced by the way families and companies are affected by the 
economic environment, macroeconomic factors will take a substantial part in the explanation 
of the credit risk in this study. 
 
3. Data and hypotheses to test 
The dataset consists of a panel of five European countries (the GIPSI) spanning the 
period from the first quarter of 1997 to the third quarter of 2011.The difficult economic 
conditions that these countries are facing (recession and unemployment), the high levels of 
public deficits and debts that they present and the problems that they have felt in borrowing 
money to finance their economies were critical in our decision of choosing them for this 
analysis. This unfavourable economic environment may increase the risk of credit default in 
these more vulnerable countries. Therefore, it becomes pertinent to study how 
macroeconomic variables are affecting that risk and the respective policy implications. 
The time period considered starts around the moment in which those countries took 
part in the European Economic and Monetary Union, with the Euro as a common currency. 
This time-constrain is mainly due to the available data for the credit risk variable provided by 
the central banks of each country. 
The credit risk is measured as the ratio between the (aggregate) banks’ nonperforming 
loans in their balance sheets and the total gross loans. This represents the dependent variable 
that will be used in our model. This variable is modeled at the macroeconomic level from the 
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consolidated balance sheet of each country’s banking sector. In Figure 1, we can observe the 
evolution of the credit risk in those five countries.5 
[Insert Figure 1 around here] 
This picture shows a significant decline in the credit risk ratio from 1997 until 2008, 
especially in Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, this trend was inverted in 2008 with the 
spreading of the financial crisis that started in the US, in the year before, and that affected 
most of the developed economies. In particular, Greece and Ireland faced an exponential 
growth in the ratio of nonperforming loans, which can be seen as a sign of their fragile 
budgetary and banking conditions that were exposed by the financial crisis. This may have 
also been one additional factor that forced them to ask for financial help to the IMF, European 
Union and to the European Central Bank in 2010. Portugal was also forced to ask for financial 
support in 2011, but the increase in the ratio was not so huge. In this case, the big issue is 
more on the side of the public accounts. Even though so far Spain and Italy have not asked for 
financial support, the problem with the nonperforming loans in these countries is becoming 
serious and may put in danger the banking system if no effective measures are taken. 
To provide some insights on how these particular countries can adjust their 
macroeconomic policies in order to avoid an increase in the nonperforming loans, we provide 
here an analysis to identify the main macroeconomic determinants of the credit risk. Several 
macroeconomic conditionings are considered in this study. We start by considering two 
variables to control for the economic environment: the growth rate of real gross domestic 
product (GDP) and the unemployment rate (UR). 
                                                 
5
 Due to the unavailability of data for some earlier years in some countries, the sample is not balanced. 
Moreover, as the available data for the ratio of nonperforming loans for Ireland are annual, we employed a linear 
interpolation to generate quarterly series. As the annual series present a smooth evolution over time, this 
interpolation technique is considered reasonable and suitable to generate those quarterly data. The same 
technique was used to create quarterly data (from the available annual data) for the period 2000-2004 for Greece. 
  10 
The economic environment is fundamental to explain the behaviour of the credit risk. 
The expansion phase of the economy is usually characterized by a relatively low rate of 
nonperforming loans, as both consumers and firms face a sufficient stream of income and 
revenues to service their debts. However, as the booming period continues, credit is extended 
to lower-quality debtors and subsequently, when the recession phase sets in, nonperforming 
loans tend to increase. 
The unemployment rate may provide additional information regarding the impact of 
economic conditions. An increase in the unemployment rate should influence negatively the 
cash flow streams of households and increase the debt burden. With regards to firms, 
increases in unemployment may signal a decrease in production as a consequence of a drop in 
effective demand. This may lead to a decrease in revenues and a fragile debt condition. 
Empirical studies have confirmed this link between the phase of the cycle and credit 
risk/defaults in some countries at several disaggregated levels.6 Therefore, we expect that a 
decrease in the growth rate of GDP or an increase in the unemployment rate will lead to an 
increase in the banking credit risk. 
The interest rate is another important conditioning of the credit risk because it affects 
the debt burden. This means that the effect of the interest rate on the credit risk is expected to 
be positive. In fact, the increase in the debt burden caused by rising interest rates will lead to a 
higher rate of nonperforming loans (Aver, 2008; Nkusu, 2011; Louzis et al., 2012).7 To 
control for this effect, we use the long-term interest rate (IR_lt), the real interest rate (RIR) 
and the spread between the long and short-term interest rates (IR_spd). 
Another factor that can influence the credit risk is the overall credit growth (Cred_gr). 
It transmits information on general conditions in the credit market and reflects how easy it is 
                                                 
6
 See, among others, Salas and Saurina (2002), Jakubík (2007), Quagliarello (2007), Aver (2008), Bohachova 
(2008), Bonfim (2009), Cifter et al. (2009), Kattai (2010), Nkuzu, (2011) and Louzis et al. (2012). 
7
 See also Bohachova (2008) on how higher interest rates can exacerbate problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard. 
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to get access to credit and roll over earlier contracts, if necessary, in order to avoid default 
(Kattai, 2010). We conjecture that higher levels of credit growth may increase the propensity 
for more defaults in the future because that increase might reflect that more risky loans are 
approved. Hence, this will contribute to an increasing rate of nonperforming loans in the 
future. The private indebtedness (Indebtness), measured as the ratio of total gross loans to 
GDP, is also considered in our analysis. High debt burdens make debtors more vulnerable to 
adverse shocks affecting their wealth or income, which raises the chances that they would run 
into debt servicing problems. (Pesola, 2005; Kattai, 2010; Fainstein and Novikov, 2011; 
Nkusu, 2011). Therefore, the expected sign for this variable is the same as for the overall 
credit growth. Additionally – and to separate the private from the public ”effects” – we 
consider the public debt (PubDebt) in some regressions. As the confidence of investors in a 
country decreases when public debt increases, the interest rates will tend to rise, which will 
affect the credit risk positively. 
The growth rate of the share price indices (Shares_ygr) gives an indication of the 
general financial conditions of the most important companies in the market (Bonfim, 2006; 
Aver, 2008). An increase in the stock prices reflects an improvement in those conditions and 
may contribute to a reduction in the credit defaults. As a result, we expect that a good stock 
market performance will contribute to reduce the credit risk. 
The real effective exchange rate (REER), with reference to the 27 EU members, is also 
included in the equation to control for external competitiveness. An increase in this variable 
means an appreciation of the local currency, making the goods and services produced in that 
country relatively more expensive. This weakens the competitiveness of export-oriented firms 
and affects adversely their ability to service their debt (Fofack, 2005; Nkusu, 2011). Hence, 
the impact of REER on the ratio of nonperforming loans is expected to be positive. 
Additionally, we also consider the effect of the terms of trade (TermsTrade) on the credit risk. 
Shifts in the terms of trade also affect bank’s risks by influencing the profitability of 
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borrowers. A drop in the terms of trade occurs when imports become more expensive relative 
to exports, eroding the purchasing power in a country (Bohachova, 2008). Therefore, falling 
terms of trade are expected to increase banks’ credit risk. 
Inflation is another variable to be considered, but its impact is not clear. Higher 
inflation can make debt servicing easier by reducing the real value of outstanding loans. 
However, it can also weaken borrowers’ ability to service debt by reducing their real income. 
Therefore, the relationship between inflation and credit risk can be positive or negative. 
A last variable to be included in the model is dummy variable to control for the 
financial crises period (FinCrisis): it takes value 1 from the fourth quarter of 2008 onwards, 
and 0 otherwise. The financial crises arose in the US in September 2007 and quickly spread 
out to the rest of the world. It started to affect the European economy (and the GIPSI, in 
particular) with more intensity in the end of 2008. Due to the consequent deterioration of the 
economic activity, borrowers feel more difficulties to pay their debts, therefore, increasing the 
rate of nonperforming loans. Hence, we expect a positive and significant sign for the 
coefficient on this dummy. 
A complete description of all variables employed in this study and the expected signs 
for the respective coefficients can be found in Annex in Table A.1. Descriptive statistics for 
all variables used in this study are reported in Table A.2.8 Additionally, we also test for the 
presence of unit roots in all the series employed in this study. The tests used to proceed with 
such task are the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC), Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) and Fisher-ADF tests. The 
results are also presented in Annex in Table A.4 and show that almost all the series are 
stationary at a 5% significance level, with the exception of the unemployment rate and 
indebtedness that are only stationary in differences. Hence, we can carry on with the empirical 
analysis using these stationary variables in the econometric model. 
 
                                                 
8
 Se also Table A.3 for correlations between all the variables used in this study. 
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4. Econometric model 
According to the literature in panel data studies, a dynamic approach should be 
adopted in order to account for the time persistence in the credit risk structure.9 Therefore, the 
model to be estimated is given by: 
itiit
J
j
jitjit CredRiskCredRisk εηγα ++++= ∑
=
−
βx '
1
    (1) 
where the subscripts i=1,…,N and t=1,…,T denote the cross sectional and time dimension of 
the panel, respectively; itx  is a k×1 vector of explanatory variables, β  is a k×1, vector of 
coefficients, iη  are the unobserved country-specific effects and itε is the error term. 
We will start our analysis by considering some traditional panel data estimators: 
pooled-OLS, fixed-effects (FE) and random effects (RE). These are used as a very simple 
starting point to our empirical exploration of the data. However, as noticed for example by 
Baltagi (2008), the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent even if itε  are not serially 
correlated. The random effects estimator is also biased in a dynamic panel data model. 
Nevertheless, as T gets large, the fixed effects estimator becomes consistent. As the time 
dimension in our sample is relatively large, the bias from the correlation between the lagged 
dependent variable and the country-specific effects might be small and this estimator could be 
a reasonable choice for our analysis. The problem is that Judson and Owen (1999) notice that 
even for T=30 the bias can be as much as 20% of the true value of the coefficient of interest. 
These problems can be addressed by first-differencing equation (1): 
itit
J
j
jitjit CredRiskCredRisk εγ ∆+∆+∆=∆ ∑
=
−
βx '
1
    (2) 
                                                 
9
 See, among others, Salas and Saurina (2002), Quagliarello (2007), Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Merkl and 
Stolz (2009) and Louzis et al. (2012). In fact, some lags of the dependent variable have to be included in our 
analysis to account for that persistence. Only those that are statistically significant are included. 
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Thus, the country-specific effects are eliminated and instrumental variable estimators such as 
those proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991) can be used in 
its estimation. These two estimators produce consistent estimates, but the Arellano-Bond 
(AB) generalized method of the moments (GMM) estimator is more efficient. Hence, we will 
solve the problems described above by employing it in this study. Lags of order j+1 and more 
of the dependent variable (and lags of the regressors) can be used to satisfy the respective 
moment conditions:10 
0] [ =∆
− itsitCredRiskE ε   and  0] [ =∆− itsitE εx     (3) 
for Tjt ,...,2+=  and 1+≥ js . 
These orthogonality restrictions are the basis of the one-step GMM estimation which, under 
the assumption of independent and homoscedastic residuals, produces consistent parameter 
estimates. Following the Arellano-Bond methodology, the differences of the strictly 
exogenous regressors are instrumented with themselves and the dependent and 
predetermined/endogenous variables are instrumented with their lagged levels. This procedure 
requires that no second-order autocorrelation is present in the differenced equation. In fact, 
while the presence of first-order autocorrelation in the error terms does not imply 
inconsistency of the estimates, the presence of second-order autocorrelation generates 
inconsistent estimates (Arellano and Bond, 1991).11 
The validity of the instruments used in the moment conditions is also crucial for the 
consistency of the GMM estimates. Hence, we test the overall validity of the instruments 
using the Sargan specification test proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundel and Bond (1998).12 
                                                 
10
 For further details, see Arellano and Bond (1991) and Baltagi (2008, p.149-155). 
11
 The assumption that the errors, (εit) are serially uncorrelated can be assessed by testing for the hypothesis that 
the differenced errors (∆εit) are not second order autocorrelated. Rejection of the null of no second order 
autocorrelation of ∆εit implies serial correlation for εit and thus inconsistency of the GMM estimates. 
12
 Under the null of valid moment conditions, the Sargan test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-square. 
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Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed another variant of the GMM estimator, namely 
the two-step estimator, which utilizes the estimated residuals in order to construct a consistent 
variance-covariance matrix of the moment conditions. Although the two-step estimator is 
asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator and relaxes the assumption of 
homoscedasticity, the efficiency gains are not that important even in the case of 
heteroscedastic errors.13 This result is supported by Judson and Owen (1999), who showed 
empirically that the one-step estimator outperforms the two-step estimator. Moreover, the 
two-step estimator imposes a bias in standard errors due to its dependence relatively to 
estimated residuals from the one-step estimator (Windmeijer, 2005), which may lead to 
unreliable asymptotic statistical inference (Bond, 2002; Bond and Windmeijeir, 2002). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) notice that this issue should be 
taken into account especially when the cross section dimension is relatively small, which is 
precisely the case our sample. 
 
5. Empirical results 
We start our empirical analysis emphasizing the impact of the economic environment 
on the credit risk. Next we consider the impact of other relevant macroeconomic variables. 
Additionally, we also provide a sensitivity analysis and some robustness checks. 
 
5.1. Macroeconomic conditionings 
Despite the problems mentioned above regarding the traditional panel data estimators 
in a dynamic framework, we present first the results from a pooled-OLS, fixed-effects (FE) 
and random effects (RE). Those results are reported in Table 1 (columns 1-6) and Table 2 
(columns 1-4). The Arellano-Bond (AB) estimator is then employed to overcome the bias and 
inconsistency of the OLS estimation methods (Table 1, columns 7-8; Table 2, columns 5-8). 
                                                 
13
 See Arellano and Bond (1991), Blundel and Bond (1998) and Blundell et al. (2000). 
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[Insert Table 1 around here] 
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
To begin with, two lags of the dependent variable are included in the set of regressors 
to capture the effect of possible omitted explanatory variables and the persistence of the credit 
risk. The results indicate that there is indeed persistence in the adjustment to the long-run 
equilibrium. When random effects are controlled for, only the first lag of the dependent 
variable is statistically significant. The FE estimator seems to be the most appropriate – 
according to the F-test, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier test and Hausman test – when the 
economic environment is controlled for using the growth rate of real GDP. However, the RE 
estimator is preferable when the unemployment variable is used instead (see Table 1). The 
inclusion of additional macroeconomic variables makes the pooled-OLS preferable according 
to the F-test (see Table 2).14 In any case, the results are quite similar and the coefficient 
estimates seem to be robust to these different estimation techniques. 
As expected, the results reported in Table 1 indicate that when GDP grows and the 
unemployment rate falls the rate of nonperforming loans decreases significantly.15 Looking at 
these results from a different perspective, we conclude that the credit risk tends to increase 
when the economic environment deteriorates, which is in line with the findings of Salas and 
Saurina (2002), Bonfim (2006), Quagliarello (2007), Bohachova (2006), Cifter et al. (2009), 
Kattai, (2010) and Louzis et al. (2012). An additional confirmation of that fact is given by the 
impact of the financial crisis on the credit risk: during the financial crisis period – here 
collected by the dummy FinCrisis – the credit risk has increased substantially. 
                                                 
14
 As the number of countries in our sample is lower than the number of variables included in all the estimations 
in Table 2, it is not possible to estimate the model controlling for random effects. 
15
 One lag of GDP and ∆UR are considered to take into account the plausible delay with which economic shocks 
affect the likelihood of default and to avoid reverse causality issues and simultaneity problems. As the variable 
UR is not stationary, we use its first difference, which provides more consistent and robust estimates. We prefer 
to estimate the effects of GDP and ∆UR separately to avoid the bias generated by the strong link between these 
two variables. In fact, they are both used as proxies to the economic environment. 
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As mentioned above, to overcome the bias and inconsistency of the OLS estimation 
methods, we employ the Arellano-Bond estimator to the data. Four lags of the dependent 
variable are used as instruments and the macroeconomic variables are considered as strictly 
exogenous since they are all lagged by (at least) one period. This procedure avoids a huge 
number of instruments given that we have just five cross-sectional units in the sample. The 
consistence of the estimator is assured since the AR tests for serial correlation in the 
differenced residuals provide evidence of significant negative first-order autocorrelation but 
no evidence of second-order autocorrelation. Moreover, the validity of the instruments used in 
this analysis is also confirmed by the Sargan test. 
The results reported in Table 1 for the AB estimator are quite interesting because they 
reinforce the conclusion that the economic conditions influence greatly the level of credit risk 
in the economy. On one hand, a decrease of one percentage point in the growth rate of real 
GDP conducts to an immediate increase in the risk of credit of about 0.035 percentage points, 
ceteris paribus.16 On the other hand, an acceleration of one point in the unemployment rate 
generates an increase of 0.175 percentage points in the rate of nonperforming loans, ceteris 
paribus. Our results also show that during the recent financial crises that rate has increased, on 
average, by about 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points. Thus, these findings point out to the 
importance that economic policies should give to the promotion of growth and employment to 
avoid serious problems of credit default and banking crises. 
To explore a little more the impact of the macroeconomic environment on the credit 
risk, we include in the model some additional variables that can influence it and that can be 
controlled more directly by the fiscal and monetary authorities. One important example is the 
interest rate as it affects the debt burden and, consequently, the likelihood of a borrower 
paying his debt. The long-term interest rate (IR_lt) is used as a benchmark in our analysis 
                                                 
16
 The long-run coefficients can be computed dividing each short-run coefficient by one minus the sum of the 
coefficients on the lags of the dependent variable; the standard errors can be obtained by the delta method. 
  18 
because most of the loans are usually agreed for a long period of time. The results reported in 
Table 2 reinforce the importance of the economic environment and show that higher interest 
rates tend to increase the credit risk significantly. This evidence is more robust when the more 
adequate and consistent AB estimator is used. In particular, we will rely on the results 
provided in columns 7 and 8 because, with the additional macroeconomic conditionings in the 
AB estimator, we only need one lag of the dependent variable to account for its persistence.17 
Thus, for the interest rate we observe that for each percentage point increase in the 
long-term interest rate the rate of nonperforming loans increases by about 0.06 percentage 
points, ceteris paribus. This result confirms the important link between the interest rate and 
the credit risk pointed out by Nkusu (2011) and Louzis et al. (2012) calls our attention to the 
essential role that monetary authorities can play in the stabilization of that risk. 
We also consider that when credit expands or grows faster, the risk of more defaults in 
the future may increase because that expansion might be achieved at the cost of more risky 
loans. As that effect may not be felt immediately, we decided to try several lags of the 
quarterly growth rate of the loans provided by banks (Cred_gr) and found that its effect is felt 
with more significance three periods after the expansion in the loans granted to the economy. 
Moreover, that impact is positive, as expected. This means that a substantial expansion in 
credit may reflect that several risky loans are being approved increasing the number of 
potential defaults in the future. The role of the regulatory authorities is very important here to 
prevent such situations and to supervise whether the prudential rules for granting loans to the 
economy are being followed or not. 
The annual growth rate of the share price indices (Shares_ygr) is another variable that 
we consider in the analysis as an indicator for the state of the economy. In particular, it 
provides a general indication of the firms’ financial conditions. The results show that an 
                                                 
17
 All the additional macroeconomic regressors are included with (at least) one lag by the same reasons pointed 
out above for GDP and ∆UR. 
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increase in the stock prices – that reflect an improvement in the financial conditions – 
contributes to a reduction of the rate of nonperforming loans. 
The lag of the real effective exchange rate (REER), with reference to the 27 EU 
members, is also included in the equation to control for external competitiveness. Our 
findings point out to the fact that an increase in this variable contributes to an increase in the 
credit risk. In fact, a real appreciation of the local currency reflects the fact that the goods and 
services produced in the country are relatively more expensive. This weakens the 
competitiveness of export-oriented firms and affects adversely their ability to service their 
debts. Consequently, the ratio of nonperforming loans increases. As the countries in our 
sample share a single currency – the Euro – that is beyond their control, the only way for 
them to achieve a real depreciation is by reducing their costs of production and/or creating the 
necessary conditions to increase their productivity levels. This is a strategy that they should 
take not only to reduce the credit risk, but also to make their economies more competitive. 
The recent financial crisis has exposed several weaknesses and structural problems in 
these five economies and our results point out to and additional one: the increase in the credit 
risk. Thus, all the structural measures and programmes that can be implemented – and some 
are being implemented, especially in those countries that are receiving external financial help 
– to promote their external competitiveness, to increase the productivity, to reduce the 
external and public debt and to support growth and employment are fundamental to stabilize 
their economies. Consequently, the ratio of nonperforming loans may decrease substantially. 
 
5.2. Sensitivity analysis 
The variables selected to the empirical analysis presented in the previous sub-section 
are considered the most representative of the macroeconomic environment that may influence 
the credit risk. In Table 3, we provide a sensitivity analysis where some of those variables are 
replaced by other related proxies that try to collect the same kind of effect. We should stress 
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that despite all the experiments made with the (additional) macroeconomic variables, the 
effect of the economic environment on the credit risk remains statistically significant. 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
We start by replacing the long-term interest rate by the real interest rate (RIR) and by 
the spread between the long and short-term interest rates (IR_spd). The coefficients on these 
variables remain positive, but only the coefficient on IR_spd is marginally significant. Even 
though the results point out in the same direction, the nominal long-term interest rate is more 
suitable because most of the loans are usually agreed for a long period of time and economic 
agents tend to look at the available nominal rates when they take their decisions. 
As the variable Cred_gr does not distinguishes between private and public loans, we 
decided to replace this variable by the private and public indebtedness. The private 
indebtedness (Indebtness) is measured by the ratio of total private loans to GDP, while the 
public indebtedness is proxied by the government public debt as percentage of GDP 
(PubDebt).18 The results provided in columns 3 and 4 show that increases in private 
indebtedness have the same effect as credit growth. This means that high private debt burdens 
make borrowers more vulnerable to adverse shocks affecting their wealth or income, which 
raises the chances that they would run into debt servicing problems. However, the level or 
even the changes in public debt have not proved to be relevant to the level of credit risk in the 
economies considered in our sample. 
In regression 5, we replace the annual growth rate in the share price indices by the 
respective quarterly growth rate (Shares_qgr), lagged three periods. The results show an 
effect that is quite similar to the one found for Shares_ygr. Moreover, they also show that it 
takes some time before the changes in the stock market affect the credit risk significantly. 
                                                 
18
 As private indebtedness is not stationary, we use its first difference in the model. The coefficient on Indebtness 
has also proved to be more statistically significant three periods after its expansion. 
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The terms of trade (TermsTrade) are used in regression 6 instead of REER, but no 
significant effects are found for this variable. This might mean that simple nominal changes in 
exports relatively to imports are not as relevant to erode borrowers’ profitability or purchasing 
power as changes in the real exchange rate. 
Inflation is another variable considered in this analysis. However, this variable has no 
relevant impact on credit risk. We believe this is the case because inflation not only erodes the 
real value of the outstanding loans but also the borrowers’ real income. As one effect is 
virtually cancelled by the other, the final impact of the inflation on the credit risk is null. 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
To evaluate the robustness of our results to the data and to the estimation procedures, 
we provide here an analysis restricting the sample at time and individual levels (Table 4) and 
considering other alternative estimators (Table 5). 
We start by limiting the sample to the period in which the Euro is in circulation (from 
the first quarter of 2001 onwards). The results are not significantly affected with this time-
truncation and the main conclusions remain valid. The same happens when we exclude the 
financial crisis period from the sample. Looking at the first four regressions in Table 4, we 
observe that only the coefficient on GDP looses its statistical significance with the reduction 
of the sample size, but the unemployment rate is still supporting the relevance of the 
economic environment on the credit risk (as well as the dummy for the financial crisis). 
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
In the next step, we decided to exclude a country at a time from the sample. We start 
by excluding those countries that are under an external financial help programme (Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal); the others (Spain and Italy) are excluded next. In general, the main 
findings and conclusions remain unchanged, but there are two results that deserve some 
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consideration. First, the coefficient on GDP is no longer significant when Ireland is excluded 
from the sample. This country presents high rates of growth in the 1990s and in the first half 
of the 2000s which are linked to lower rates of nonperforming loans. In the second half of the 
2000s this relation was inverted, with a substantial decrease in the growth rate of GDP being 
followed by an increase in the credit risk. This can be an indication that this country 
contributes greatly to the significant negative relation between GDP and CredRisk in our 
sample. Second, Portugal, Spain and Italy also contribute significantly to the relation found 
between the interest rate and credit risk. When those countries are excluded from the sample 
the statistical link between these two variables is not so strong. In fact, the increase in the 
interest rates contributed considerably to unveil their weaknesses at the private and public 
levels, consequently affecting the credit risk in those economies. 
Another set of robustness checks takes into consideration how the data behaves with 
regards to different estimators. We consider first the system-GMM estimator. This was 
develop by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) to solve the problem 
that the lagged-level instruments in the AB estimator become weak when the autoregressive 
process becomes too persistent or the ratio of the variance of the panel-level effects to the 
variance of the idiosyncratic error becomes too large. This estimator considers additional 
moment conditions in which lagged differences are used as instruments for the level equation 
in addition to the moment conditions of lagged levels as instruments for the differenced 
equation. This method assumes that there is no autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors and 
requires the initial condition that the panel-level effects be uncorrelated with the first 
difference of the first observation of the dependent variable. 
The results are presented in Table 5 (columns 1 and 2) and show that only the 
coefficient on the interest rate has lost its statistical significance. However, this may not be 
the most adequate estimator to apply to the available data for the following reasons: first, the 
Sargan test clearly rejects the underlying assumptions of the model; second, the coefficient on 
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the lag of the dependent variable is higher than one; third, this estimator is specifically 
designed for datasets with many panels and (very) few periods, which is not really the case in 
our dataset. Nevertheless, despite all this problems, the main results provided by this 
estimator are not very different from the ones obtained with the AB estimator. 
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
Even though the AB is more efficient than the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator, we 
report the results from the AH estimator to check whether the differences in the results are 
significant or not. Looking at regressions 3 and 4, we conclude that our findings remain 
unchanged. Despite the tests indicating that the instruments used are not weak and the 
presence of endogeneity (Wu-Hausman test), the overidentifying restrictions are not valid (see 
Sargan test). Hence, it is better to rely on the AB estimator, which is more efficient than this. 
An alternative estimation procedure is suggested by Kiviet (1995), especially for small 
panels (with a small number of individuals). He derives a formula for the bias of the least-
square dummy variables (LSDV) estimator and recommends subtracting this from the 
estimated LSDV coefficients. The estimation of the LSDV correction involves a two-step 
procedure in which the residuals from a first-step consistent estimator (for simplicity, we use 
the AH estimator) are employed in the second-stage calculation of the bias. Judson and Owen 
(1999) notice that the Kiviet's corrected LSDV estimator (LSDVC) can outperform the AB 
estimator in some cases. In Monte Carlo experiments they show that its bias tends to be lower 
and that it produces the most efficient estimates, especially in small panels. As the number of 
individuals in or sample is small, we decided to employ this estimator in the regressions 5 and 
6. Once again, the main conclusions of this paper are supported by this alternative estimator.19 
                                                 
19
 Although this estimator is theoretically appealing, it is computationally slower to retrieve the results because it 
not only involves two estimation steps but also the estimation of bootstrap standard errors. Moreover, it presents 
an estimate for the coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable that is almost equal to one, which could point 
out to a re-specification of the model with the dependent variable in first differences. We will check this below. 
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With the increase in time observations in a dynamic panel, nonstationarity can be a 
concern. Recent papers by Pesaran, Shin, and Smith (1999) offer a different technique to 
estimate stationary and nonstationary dynamic panels in which the time (and the number of 
groups) is large and some parameters are considered heterogeneous across groups: the pooled 
mean-group (PMG) estimator. This estimator relies on a combination of pooling and 
averaging of coefficients. Given the advantages of this estimator, we also apply it to our 
model constraining the coefficients on the macroeconomic variables to be identical, but 
allowing the coefficient on the lag of the dependent variable and the error variances to differ 
across groups. Looking at regressions 7 and 8, we conclude that, despite the number of 
individuals being small, the results that we get with this estimator are very similar to the ones 
obtained with the AB estimator. 
A final robustness check takes into account the fact that the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is very close to one in the Sys-GMM, AH and LSDVC estimators. 
Allowing for the possibility of being equal to one, we transform the model in such a way that 
the dependent variable is now the first difference of credit risk (∆CredRisk) and it is a 
function of the other regressors. Employing the OLS estimator over this new specification 
(called here OLS-Diff), we found no significant differences in the results in comparison with 
the other estimators.20 
Thus, we conclude that our results and conclusions are robust to different kinds of 
estimators. Given their specificities, some are more suitable to our data than others. However, 
our preference for the AB estimator in this study is justified by its consistence, efficiency and 
reasonable adequacy to the data (as indicated by all diagnostic tests). 
 
                                                 
20
 We are not controlling for fixed effects because the F-test does not reject the simple pooling. Moreover, this 
estimator and specification would be very appealing if ∆CredRisk was stationary, but that is not the case. For 
example the IPS-test presents a p-value of 0.4699 for ∆CredRisk. 
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6. Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis has revived the interest on the analysis of the problems that 
banking crises can have over the economy and on the factors that may trigger a banking crisis. 
However, before looking at the causes of banking crisis, we should give some attention to the 
conditionings of the banking credit risk. In reality, before a banking crisis arises, banks can be 
struggling with liquidity and/or insolvency problems caused by the increase of bad or 
nonperforming loans in their balance sheets. Thus, to understand the origin of banking crises 
it is necessary starting by considering the factors that affect baking credit risk in first place. 
Several studies have focused their attention on this matter and have concluded that the 
macroeconomic environment has a strong influence on banking credit risk. In this paper, we 
analyse deeply the link between the macroeconomics and banking credit risk in the GIPSI. 
Employing dynamic panel data approaches to these group countries over the period 1997q1-
2011q3, we conclude that the banking credit risk is significantly affected by the 
macroeconomic environment: the credit risk increases when GDP growth and the share price 
indices decrease and rises when the unemployment rate, interest rate, and credit growth 
increase; it is also positively affected by an appreciation of the real exchange rate; moreover, 
we observe a substantial increase in the credit risk during the recent financial crisis period. 
Several robustness tests with different estimators have also confirmed these results. 
In terms of policy implications, this means that structural measures and programmes 
that can be implemented to promote external competitiveness, to increase productivity, to 
reduce external and public debt and to support growth and employment in these countries are 
fundamental to stabilize their economies. 
From this analysis we may think of some interesting avenues for future research. First, 
it would be interesting to extend it to other EU countries. The problem is that comparable 
aggregate data for credit risk is not always available. Thus, a possible alternative would be to 
look at the disaggregated banking level, provided that reliable (and comparable) time series 
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for nonperforming loans are available for the most relevant credit institutions. In this case, in 
particular, the group of regressors could be extended with the inclusion of some unsystematic 
or microeconomics factors, which will provide a deeper understanding of banking credit risk 
as well as additional insights on the link between the recent financial crisis and the risk taken 
by some financial and banking institutions. Finally, as the output effects of credit market 
frictions could be nonlinear, it may also be worth exploring possible threshold effects. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Empirical results based simply on the economic behaviour 
 OLS OLS FE FE RE RE AB AB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CredRisk(-1) 1.410*** 1.402*** 1.303*** 1.370*** 0.967*** 0.957*** 1.136*** 1.156*** 
 (14.36) (14.66) (12.52) (11.22) (65.16) (50.07) (11.51) (10.97) 
CredRisk(-2) -0.433*** -0.426*** -0.334*** -0.406***   -0.194* -0.217** 
 (-4.52) (-4.59) (-2.90) (-3.31)   (-1.72) (-1.96) 
GDP(-1) -0.024**  -0.041***  -0.056***  -0.034***  
 (-2.50)  (-3.82)  (-4.02)  (-2.62)  
∆UR(-1)  0.180***  0.185**  0.291***  0.174* 
  (2.93)  (2.50)  (3.61)  (1.92) 
FinCrisis 0.225*** 0.245*** 0.196*** 0.271*** 0.291*** 0.428*** 0.308** 0.397*** 
 (3.32) (3.93) (3.37) (4.98) (3.18) (3.26) (2.46) (3.75) 
         
No. Obs. 236 241 236 241 240 246 231 236 
R2 0.9912 0.9928 0.9909 0.9927 0.9892 0.9917   
SBIC 45.59 38.05 20.25 24.06     
F-test   4.99 
[0.001] 
2.08 
[0.084] 
    
LM-test     75.74 
[0.000] 
4.11 
[0.043] 
  
Hausman-test     33.59 
[0.000] 
3.10 
[0.377] 
  
AR1-test       -1.91 
[0.056] 
-1.99 
[0.047] 
AR2-test       1.58 
[0.115] 
1.68 
[0.092] 
Sargan-test       206.75 
[0.207] 
202.32 
[0.345] 
         
Notes: For sources, see Table A.1 in Annex. All models were estimated with a constant. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The model was 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects (FE); random-effects (RE); and one-step Arellano-Bond (AB) 
GMM estimator. For each regression are presented the number of observations (No. Obs.), the coefficient of 
determination (R2) and the Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). The F-test presents the statistics and 
respective p-values (in square brackets) for the test to the presence of fixed effects; The LM-test is the Breusch-Pagan 
test for random effects; The Hausman-test is used to select between a random or a fixed-effects estimator; AR1 and 
AR2 tests are the Arellano-Bond tests for first and second-order autocorrelation in first-differenced errors; The 
statistics and p-values (in square brackets) for the Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions are also reported for the 
AB estimations. 
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Table 2. Empirical results based on additional macroeconomic conditionings 
 OLS OLS FE FE AB AB AB AB 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CredRisk(-1) 1.177*** 1.186*** 1.149*** 1.179*** 0.999*** 1.003*** 0.978*** 0.982*** 
 (12.19) (11.38) (11.18) (10.66) (7.62) (7.19) (59.03) (52.87) 
CredRisk(-2) -0.170* -0.177* -0.153 -0.180* -0.021 -0.021   
 (-1.80) (-1.72) (-1.56) (-1.70) (-0.16) (-0.15)   
GDP(-1) -0.024***  -0.029**  -0.022**  -0.023**  
 (-3.15)  (-2.25)  (2.23)  (-2.20)  
∆UR(-1)  0.089  0.085  0.100**  0.103*** 
  (1.58)  (1.48)  (2.33)  (2.17) 
IR_lt(-1) 0.044 0.041* 0.049 0.052* 0.056** 0.060** 0.060*** 0.063*** 
 (1.58) (1.75) (1.56) (1.92) (2.49) (2.48) (2.65) (2.61) 
Cred_gr(-3) 0.030*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.022** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (3.80) (3.11) (2.88) (2.48) (5.79) (5.22) (4.70) (5.15) 
Shares_ygr(-1) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** 
 (-4.24) (-4.53) (-3.38) (-4.09) (-3.66) (-4-43) (-2.53) (-3.10) 
REER(-1) 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.031*** 0.037*** 
 (6.40) (5.86) (3.65) (5.69) (2.75) (3.70) (3.06) (4.91) 
FinCrisis 0.133** 0.179*** 0.131* 0.157** 0.178*** 0.207*** 0.193*** 0.224*** 
 (1.98) (2.95) (1.89) (2.48) (3.97) (5.58) (3.48) (4.55) 
         
No. Obs. 225 226 225 226 220 221 223 224 
R2 0.9927 0.9925 0.9928 0.9926     
SBIC -11.09 -6.47 5.92 10.37     
F-test   1.28 
[0.279] 
1.10 
[0.358] 
    
AR1-test     -2.13 
[0.034] 
-2.10 
[0.036] 
-1.83 
[0.067] 
-1.87 
[0.060] 
AR2-test     1.13 
[0.260] 
1.12 
[0.264] 
0.95 
[0.341] 
0.98 
[0.3280] 
Sargan-test     205.40 
[0.134] 
202.74 
[0.177] 
207.40 
[0.158] 
203.77 
[0.219] 
         
Notes: For sources, see Table A.1 in Annex. All models were estimated with a constant. Robust t-statistics are in 
parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. The model was 
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed-effects (FE); and one-step Arellano-Bond (AB) GMM estimator. For 
each regression are presented the number of observations (No. Obs.), the coefficient of determination (R2) and the 
Schwarz's Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) – except for the AB regressions. The F-test presents the statistics 
and respective p-values (in square brackets) for the test to the presence of fixed effects; AR1 and AR2 tests are the 
Arellano-Bond tests for first and second-order autocorrelation in first-differenced errors; The statistics and p-values 
(in square brackets) for the Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions are also reported for the AB estimations. 
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Table 3. Sensitivity analysis 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
CredRisk(-1) 0.977*** 0.967*** 0.964*** 0.982*** 0.968*** 0.953*** 0.970*** 0.969*** 
 (56.77) (55.13) (93.12) (55.42) (57.12) (50.82) (68.34) (81.84) 
GDP(-1) -0.014*  -0.023*  -0.025**  -0.015**  
 (-1.78)  (-1.75)  (-2.46)  (-2.11)  
∆UR(-1)  0.111**  0.098**  0.164***  0.085** 
  (2.30)  (2.38)  (3.00)  (2.22) 
IR_lt(-1)   0.045 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.057*** 0.077*** 0.085*** 
   (1.51) (2.77) (3.01) (3.73) (3.06) (3.10) 
RIR(-1) 0.033        
 (1.53)        
IR_spd  0.040*       
  (1.95)       
Cred_gr(-3) 0.025*** 0.026***   0.019*** 0.015*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
 (5.03) (4.23)   (3.62) (3.65) (4.72) (5.19) 
∆Indebtness(-3)   0.307** 0.325**     
   (2.10) (2.01)     
PubDebt(-3)   0.006      
   (0.90)      
∆PubDebt(-3)    -0.002     
    (-0.13)     
Shares_ygr(-1) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002***  -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (-3.30) (3.52) (-2.29) (-3.00)  (-2.29) (-2.75) (-3.43) 
Shares_qgr(-3)     -0.004**    
     (-2.45)    
REER(-1) 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.026** 0.033*** 0.030***  0.035*** 0.037*** 
 (3.02) (9.01) (2.40) (6.65) (2.75)  (3.14) (4.06) 
TermsTrade(-1)      -0.054   
      (-0.05)   
Infl(-1)       -0.028 -0.032 
       (-1.13) (1.19) 
FinCrisis 0.190*** 0.245*** 0.128 0.204*** 0.207*** 0.394*** 0.161*** 0.173*** 
 (2.97) (3.89) (1.34) (2.59) (3.01) (6.36) (2.93) (3.37) 
         
No. Obs. 223 224 223 224 223 224 223 224 
AR1-test -1.80 
[0.071] 
-1.88 
[0.061] 
-1.76 
[0.077] 
-1.85 
[0.0644] 
-1.91 
[0.055] 
-1.91 
[0.057] 
-1.82 
[0.068] 
-1.87 
[0.062] 
AR2-test 0.97 
[0.333] 
1.10 
[0.271] 
1.11 
[0.265] 
1.10 
[0.269] 
1.14 
[0.254] 
1.26 
[0.208] 
0.89 
[0.373] 
0.91 
[0.364] 
Sargan-test 212.21 
[0.109] 
216.40 
[0.084] 
214.87 
[0.087] 
207.41 
[0.171] 
215.31 
[0.084] 
215.45 
[0.091] 
206.70 
[0.166] 
213.24 
[0.109] 
         
Notes: See Table 2. All models were estimated with a constant. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance 
level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
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Table 4. Robustness checks: data 
 Year>2000 Year>2000 Year<2009 Year<2009 GRC out GRC out IRE out IRE out PRT out PRT out SP, IT out SP, IT out 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
CredRisk(-1) 0.985*** 0.987*** 0.972*** 0.973*** 0.973*** 0.981*** 0.972*** 0.972*** 0.976*** 0.985*** 0.965*** 0.982*** 
 (49.94) (44.72) (31.52) (32.90) (55.50) (46.23) (48.42) (48.09) (38.10) (37.71) (33.63) 42.40 
GDP(-1) -0.018  -0.017  -0.025**  -0.010  -0.021***  -0.035***  
 (-1.56)  (-1.30)  (-2.24)  (-0.72)  (-2.97)  (-4.47)  
∆UR(-1)  0.112**  0.075***  0.085*  0.040***  0.095*  0.116* 
  (2.28)  (4.59)  (1.87)  (2.76)  (1.72)  (1.66) 
IR_lt(-1) 0.052** 0.059** 0.066** 0.058* 0.141*** 0.136*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.069 0.061 0.046 0.050 
 (2.15) (2.15) (2.04) (1.71) (4.83) (6.27) (2.90) (3.27) (1.49) (1.38) (1.54) (1.40) 
Cred_qgr(-3) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.026** 0.026** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
 (3.50) (3.91) (2.00) (2.15) (2.91) (3.87) (3.68) (4.59) (3.63) (5.07) (3.97) (5.84) 
Shares_ygr(-1) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001 -0.002** -0.002* -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.002** 
 (-4.29) (4.36) (-2.77) (-3.15) (-1.56) (-2.18) (-1.69) (-2.48) (-5.79) (-5.84) (-1.36) (-2.15) 
REER(-1) 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.052*** 0.060*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.049*** 0.022** 0.035*** 
 (3.52) (6.01) (5.31) (5.32) (3.91) (4.71) (2.82) (3.38) (4.15) (5.11) (2.12) (12.56) 
FinCrisis 0.168*** 0.180***   0.100*** 0.122*** 0.147** 0.162** 0.134** 0.165*** 0.295*** 0.311*** 
 (2.95) (3.73)   (2.84) (3.99) (2.20) (2.13) (2.26) (2.86) (4.06) (6.34) 
             
No. Obs. 199 200 172 172 188 189 184 185 170 170 127 128 
AR1-test -1.92 
[0.055] 
-1.96 
[0.050] 
-1.50 
[0.134] 
-1.51 
[0.132] 
-1.60 
[0.110] 
-1.63 
[0.104] 
-1.71 
[0.087] 
-1.71 
[0.087] 
-1.54 
[0.123] 
-1.58 
[0.114] 
-1.66 
[0.097] 
-1.68 
[0.092] 
AR2-test 0.66 
[0.512] 
0.66 
[0.507] 
0.83 
[0.405] 
0.81 
[0.417] 
1.33 
[0.1849] 
1.31 
[0.189] 
0.92 
[0.358] 
0.95 
[0.345] 
0.45 
[0.651] 
0.43 
[0.671] 
0.26 
[0.797] 
0.30 
[0.764] 
Sargan-test 197.11 
[0.040] 
192.29 
[0.072] 
161.27 
[0.183] 
160.53 
[0.194] 
160.06 
[0.218] 
159.60 
(0.243) 
160.93 
[0.204] 
160.53 
[0.227] 
158.50 
[0.082] 
157.42 
[0.091] 
105.90 
[0.153] 
106.85 
[0.155] 
             
Notes: See Table 2. All models were estimated with a constant. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 
1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. In regressions (1) and (2) only the period 2001q1-2011q1 is considered. In regressions (3) and (4) the financial crisis period (after 2008q4) is 
excluded. In regressions (5) and (6) Greece is excluded from the sample; In regressions (7) and (8) Ireland is excluded from the sample; In regressions (9) and (10) 
Portugal is excluded from the sample; In regressions (11) and (12) Spain and Italy are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 5. Robustness checks: different estimators 
 Sys-GMM Sys-GMM AH AH LSDVC LSDVC PMG PMG OLS-Diff OLS-Diff 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
           
CredRisk(-1) 1.013*** 1.016*** 0.991*** 0.998*** 0.997*** 1.004*** 0.974*** 0.972***   
 (96.96) (73.93) (77.65) (80.83) (51.79) (70.05) (54.64) (46.72)   
GDP(-1) -0.030**  -0.037***  -0.036**  -0.022**  -0.028***  
 (-2.42)  (-3.84)  (-2.41)  (2.60)  (-3.32)  
∆UR(-1)  0.124**  0.116***  0.117**  0.114***  0.124** 
  (2.09)  (2.57)  (2.09)  (3.42)  (2.26) 
IR_lt(-1) 0.030 0.035 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.057* 0.059** 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.061** 0.055** 
 (0.99) (1.16) (2.93) (3.27) (1.84) (2.53) (4.78) (5.60) (2.29) (2.49) 
Cred_qgr(-3) 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.019** 0.025** 0.021** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.019*** 
 (6.79) (7.20) (2.80) (2.25) (2.32) (2.03) (3.60) (3.28) (3.55) (2.59) 
Shares_ygr(-1) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-3.06) (-3.31) (-3.17) (-4.39) (-2.28) (-3.85) (-3.04) (-3.01) (4.18) (-4.45) 
REER(-1) 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.028*** 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 
 (4.44) (6.52) (4.36) (6.07) (2.77) (4.72) (3.42) (4.70) (7.38) (6.52) 
FinCrisis 0.137** 0.182*** -0.150*** 0.184*** 0.156** 0.191*** 0.169*** 0.188*** 0.172*** 0.230*** 
 (2.07) (2.62) (2.61) (3.27) (1.98) (3.15) (2.90) (3.49) (2.73) (4.21) 
           
No. Obs. 228 229 222 225 228 229 251 251 228 229 
R2   0.9920 0.9918     0.6277 0.6201 
SBIC       -54.57 -62.07 -12.57 -7.67 
F-test         1.69 
[0.154] 
1.26 
[0.286] 
AR1-test -1.82 
[0.068] 
-1.87 
[0.061] 
        
AR2-test 0.86 
[0.392] 
0.94 
[0.348] 
        
Sargan-test 287.27 
[0.022] 
285.32 
[0.032] 
12.70 
[0.013] 
8.85 
[0.065] 
      
Weak instr. 
test 
  1223.2 
[0.000] 
1229.1 
[0.000] 
      
Wu-Hausman 
test 
  5.00 
[0.026] 
7.62 
[0.006] 
      
Log-L       49.39 53.14   
           
Notes: See Table 2. All models were estimated with a constant. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. Significance level at which the null 
hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. A one-step Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond system-GMM (Sys-GMM) estimator is 
employed in regressions (1) and (2). The results presented in columns (3) and (4) were obtained using the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) estimator. 
The statistics and respective p-values (in square brackets) for the overidentifying restrictions (Sargan-test), weak instruments test and 
endogeneity test (Wu-Hausman test) are also shown for these regressions. In columns (5) and (6) are reported the results from the Kiviet's 
bias-corrected least squares dummy variable estimator (LSDVC), with the respective bootstrap standard errors in parenthesis; in these 
regressions the Anderson-Hsiao estimator is used to initialize the bias correction. A pooled mean group (PMG) estimator is employed in 
regressions (7) and (8), assuming for simplicity that only the coefficient on the lag of the dependent varies over the countries in the sample; 
the respective z-statistics and the value of the log-likelihood function are presented in this case. A simple OLS estimator with the 
dependent variable in first differences (OLS-Diff) is used to estimate the regressions in columns (9) and (10); the F-test presents the 
statistics and respective p-values (in square brackets) for the test to the presence of fixed effects. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of the credit risk in the GIPSI 
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Sources: See Table A.1 in Annex. 
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ANEXOS 
 
 
Table A.1. Description of the variables 
Variables Description Expected 
Signs 
Dependent   
CredRisk Credit risk measured as the ratio between the banks’ nonperforming loans 
and the total gross loans, in percentage.  
 
Independent   
GDP Year-on-year growth rate of real gross domestic product, in percentage 
and seasonally adjusted. 
- 
UR Unemployment rate, in percentage. + 
IR_lt Long-term interest rate, in percentage. + 
RIR Real interest rate computed as the difference between the long-term 
interest rate and the inflation rate. 
+ 
IR_spd Interest rate spread between the long-term and short-term interest rates. + 
Cred_gr Quarterly growth rate of the loans provided by banks to the economy, in 
percentage. 
+ 
Indebtness Private indebtedness in the country measured as the ratio of total gross 
loans to GDP, in percentage. 
+ 
PubDebt Government public debt as percentage of GDP. + 
Shares_ygr Annual growth rate of the share price indices, in percentage. - 
Shares_qgr Quarterly growth rate of the share price indices, in percentage. - 
REER Real effective exchange rate, with reference to the 27 EU members. + 
TermsTrade Terms of trade computed as the ratio between the price of exports and the 
price of imports. 
- 
Infl Inflation rate, in percentage. - 
FinCrisis Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the financial crises period, 
i.e. after the third quarter of 2008, and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
   
Sources: Central banks of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain; OECD Main Economic Indicators; 
Eurostat Statistics; and European Commission. 
Notes:  
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Table A.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
      
CredRisk 251 4.03 3.10 0.70 16.29 
GDP 333 2.24 3.06 -8.37 14.45 
UR 550 10.22 4.05 3.73 22.20 
IR_lt 502 7.98 4.10 3.11 19.03 
RIR 482 3.33 2.83 -5.00 14.23 
IR_spd 436 1.17 2.32 -13.99 15.05 
Cred_gr 461 3.24 2.60 -4.55 20.08 
Indebtness 266 4.64 2.21 1.37 9.66 
PubDebt 605 72.27 27.66 16.80 142.80 
Shares_ygr 416 9.72 35.22 -65.22 286.78 
Shares_qgr 431 1.82 12.18 -38.91 82.29 
REER 350 103.64 5.29 85.15 120.41 
TermsTrade 321 0.99 0.03 0.93 1.11 
Infl 635 7.06 6.63 -6.11 32.01 
FinCrisis 635 0.09 0.29 0 1 
      
Sources: See Table A.1. 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
Variables CredRisk GDP UR IR_lt IR_spd RIR Cred_gr Infl Shares_ygr Shares_mgr PubDebt Indebtness REER TermsTrade FinCrisis 
                
CredRisk 1               
GDP -0.3384 1              
UR 0.4439 -0.3713 1             
IR_lt 0.3612 -0.2116 0.1254 1            
IR_spd 0.5253 -0.4622 0.4497 0.5243 1           
RIR 0.4919 -0.5863 0.4409 0.3955 0.6176 1          
Cred_gr -0.2470 0.4992 -0.3430 0.0008 -0.2127 -0.3898 1         
Infl -0.3335 0.5176 -0.4076 0.1213 -0.3797 -0.8637 0.4217 1        
Shares_ygr -0.0392 0.5092 -0.0687 -0.2857 -0.1449 -0.1503 0.2690 0.0056 1       
Shares_qgr 0.0130 0.1849 0.0307 -0.2357 0.1102 0.1007 0.0462 -0.2382 0.5360 1      
PubDebt 0.7444 -0.3226 0.2513 0.2797 0.3458 0.3050 -0.1913 -0.1761 -0.1053 -0.0494 1     
Indebtness 0.0382 -0.4461 0.3911 0.0343 0.2476 0.2312 -0.1894 -0.2311 -0.1983 -0.1221 -0.2589 1    
REER -0.1726 -0.3735 0.1238 -0.1349 0.1890 0.1433 -0.1732 -0.2290 -0.1654 -0.0644 -0.4591 0.8663 1   
TermsTrade 0.0918 -0.0542 -0.0132 -0.0320 0.2213 0.0451 0.1301 -0.0663 0.0667 0.2360 0.0302 -0.1480 -0.0847 1  
FinCrisis 0.4007 -0.6848 0.5154 0.2423 0.6627 0.6554 -0.4090 -0.5753 -0.3207 -0.1195 0.2677 0.5673 0.4319 0.0046 1 
                
Sources: See Table A.1. 
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Table A.4. Panel unit root tests 
 LLC IPS   Fisher-ADF 
   
  Inv. χ2 Inv. N Inv. L M.Inv. χ2 
         
CredRisk -1.93 -1.84   23.71 -2.53 -2.60 3.06 
 [0.032] [0.033]   [0.008] [0.006] [0.007] [0.001] 
GDP -2.15 -1.66   41.08 -4.04 -4.89 6.95 
 [0.015] [0.049]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
UR 1.47 1.17   11.42 0.39 0.55 0.317 
 [0.929] [0.878]   [0.326] [0.652] [0.706] [0.376] 
∆UR -2.26 -4.46   77.85 -7.05 9.73 15.17 
 [0.012] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
IR_lt -2.79 -1.44   23.64 -2.58 -2.63 3.05 
 [0.007] [0.073]   [0.009] [0.005] [0.007] [0.001] 
RIR -3.04 -0.95   40.35 -4.16 -4.79 6.79 
 [0.001] [0.171]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
IR_spd -3.03 -3.07   45.86 -3.37 -4.65 8.02 
 [0.001] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Cred_gr -4.87 -3.58   66.53 -6.21 -8.22 12.64 
 [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Indebtness 1.30 2.67   8.11 0.84 0.98 -0.42 
 [0.904] [0.996]   [0.618] [0.799] [0.833] [0.664] 
∆Indebtness -1.07 -0.33   62.01 -5.89 -7.71 11.63 
 [0.142] [0.372]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
PubDebt -3.01 -1.99   29.63 -3.17 -3.43 4.39 
 [0.002] [0.023]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Shares_ygr -4.50 -5.92   90.80 -8.15 -11.40 18.07 
 [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Shares_qgr -6.45 -10.26   156.32 -11.30 -19.63 32.72 
 [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
REER -1.91 -1.48   20.90 -2.32 -2.30 2.44 
 [0.028] [0.071]   [0.022] [0.010] [0.014] [0.007] 
TermsTrade -1.44 -2.72   58.04 -5.36 -7.10 10.74 
 [0.075] [0.003]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Infl -5.79 -4.62   46.41 -5.22 -5.81 8.14 
 [0.000] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
         
Notes: For sources, see Table A.1 in Annex. The Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) unit root tests are performed 
over a balanced panel for the period 2000q4-2011q1 with constant and one lag for all regressions; the 
null hypothesis is that “all panels contain unit-roots”; from the test for each variable, we report the 
respective statistic and p-value (in square brackets). The Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) unit root tests do not 
require a the use of a balanced panel, hence they are performed over the available data considering a 
constant and one lag in all regressions; the null hypothesis is that “all panels contain unit-roots”; from 
the test for each variable, we report the respective statistic and p-value (in square brackets). The LLC 
test assumes that all panels have the same autocorrelation coefficient, but the IPS test relaxes that 
assumption and allows each panel to have its own autocorrelation coefficient. The Fisher-type unit-root 
tests are based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (Fisher-ADF) tests with drift and one lag in all regressions; 
the null hypothesis is that “all panels contain unit-roots”; this test does not requires a balanced panel 
because the tests are conducted for each panel individually before combining the p-values from those 
tests to produce the overall test; the statistics and respective p-values (in square brackets) are reported 
for each type of Fisher test: inverse chi-squared, inverse normal, inverse logit and modified inverse chi-
squared. ∆ is the first difference operator. 
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